• reality - in large part is a social construction - is institutionalized in sociology that it [social construct?] threatens to mask the different degrees of “agency”, or the different power of agents (actors).
• it [social construct] is constructed out of negotiation and agreement.
• But it is important to see the resources of those doing the most construction; ... .
• it was the exercise of organizational power. We miss a great deal when we substitute culture for power.
Charles Perrow, Normal accidents : living with high-risk technologies, 1999
p.380
Those who left the organization described that night quite differently. They made it clear, as did much other evidence she presents, that this was not the normalization of deviance or the banality of bureaucratic procedures and hierarchy or the product of an engineering “culture”; it was the exercise of organizational power. We miss a great deal when we substitute culture for power.
p.374
Clarke's work goes beyond social construction and garbage cans in two respects. The idea that reality is in large part a social construction is now so institutionalized in sociology that it threatens to mask the different degrees of “agency”, or the different power of agents (actors). Yes, what we observe is neither necessary nor “natural”; it is constructed out of negotiation and agreement. But it is important to see the resources of those doing the most construction; power and interests are still involved.
p.374
The case is similar to the ‘garbage can’ metaphor. It emphasizes the role of symbols, happenstance, variable participation, and so on, but this masks intent, power struggles, and conflicts over interests.
p.374
Clarke not only argues that the metaphor works best when trying to understand relationships among organizations rather than within them, but shows that the ‘garbage can’ nature of organizations (due to limited rationality) is itself a problem for powerful organizations. If ‘garbage can’ conditions exist, the organizations with less power (like the local health department), loosely organized associations (the fire fighters and citizen's groups), and even individual citizens have [a] chance to affect the definitions of acceptable risk.
( Normal accidents : living with high-risk technologies / Charles Perrow, 1. industrial accidents., 2. technology--risk assessment., 3. accident., HD7262 P55 1999, 363.1--dc21, 1999, )
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Arthur B. VanGundy, Managing group creativity, 1984 [ ]
p.148
Redefining the Problem
Problems are abstract representations of what we perceive reality to be. They help to provide meaning for the many different situations we encounter. Without problems, we would be unable to distinguish between what is real and what is unreal.
Just as an artist uses canvas and paint to portray some feature of life, so do we use problems to paint pictures of our existence. Like the artist, we sketch a rough outline of a problem in our minds, fill in details, use shading and perspective, and produce a finished product. The result is how we depict reality.
What we consider to be real and unreal is entirely subjective. There are no absolute standards. We each create our own reality to use in interpreting our existence. Depending on our experiences and psychological makeup, what is real for one person will not necessarily be real for another. What you consider to be a problem may be of little concern to me, and vice versa. In one respect, your problems help you deal with your world and my problems help me deal with mine. Occasionally, such as in group situations, our worlds may collide or overlap. When this occurs, our individual perceptions of reality may blend, enabling us to work together to deal with our problem situations.
p.149
When we establish limits or boundaries for a situation, we are defining a problem; when we attempt to break away from these boundaries and see what lies on the other side, we are redefining a problem. Both these actions are highly interrelated and without a beginning or an end. Where one problem ends another may begin.
To define is to understand. When we say that we are defining a problem, we are actually clarifying our understanding of a situation by the use of a concept we call a problem. Problems are not situations. Problems are ways of understanding situations. Thus, when we redefine a problem, we are providing ourselves with a circumscribed way of viewing reality.
To redefine is to change our understanding of a situation. We may achieve such change by pushing out situational boundaries or by drawing them in, by altering the shape of the boundaries or by substituting other elements into the mix that makes up our problem situation. The situation always stays the same--only our understanding changes, because we have reconstructed the boundaries or changed the elements of the situation. The result is a new definition of problem.
p.149
We need to redefine problems in order to increase our understanding of situations.
p.149
In addition, when we have extensively redefined a situation, the odds are greatly increased that we will be able to avoid correctly solving the “wrong” problem. (Note that “wrong” problem in this instance refers to a situation that is not clearly understood.) This is perhaps the most important reason for redefining a problem situation.
p.149
In actual practice, an extensively redefined problem usually is a solved problem.
(VanGundy, Arthur B., Managing group creativity / Arthur B. VanGundy, 1. problem solving, group, 1984, HD 30.29 .V35 1984, )
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imbalance in power and the power structure to define [consensus reality]*
the sharp end of power; the supporting power structure - blunt end and the
rest of the supporting instruments of the power structure
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p.172 The System-thinking Iceberg
p.173
four factors that influence any situations:
events,
patterns or trends,
deeper systemic structures or forces,
and the mental models or assumptions that shape these structures and force.
pp.174-177
p.173 events
p.174 patterns/trends
p.175 systemic structures or forces
p.176 mental models.
p.174
Ways of explaining reality
**increasing leverage and opportunity for learning
||
|| Events React
|| what just happened?
||
|| Patterns/Trends Anticipate
|| what's been happening over time?
|| have we been here or some
|| place similar before?
||
|| Systemic Structures Design
|| what are the deeper forces driving these
|| patterns or trends and how do they arise?
|| what are the forces at play
|| contributing to these pathways?
||
|| Mental Models Transform
|| what about our thinking
|| allows this situation to persist?
\/
figure 12.1
p.177
Why is it so important to look beneath the surface at the deeper levels of reality? Because in our experience it is often the key to lasting change. When people or organizations pay attention only to the visible tip of the iceberg, they can only react to change as it happens—so at best, they survive the crisis. They often try to compensate for their lack of analysis of a problem with aggressive and "proactive" strategies. But being "proactive" from a reactive mind-set is reactive just the same. With long enough lever, boasted Archimedes, "I cann move the world."
(The necessary revolution : how individual and organizations are working together to create a sustainable world, Peter Senge, Bryan Smith, Nina Kruschwitz, Joe Laur, Sara Schley, 2008, 338.927 Senge, pp.172-177)
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